Blame the Fed for the Financial Crisis

Ron Paul writes:

To know what is wrong with the Federal Reserve, one must first understand the nature of money. Money is like any other good in our economy that emerges from the market to satisfy the needs and wants of consumers. Its particular usefulness is that it helps facilitate indirect exchange, making it easier for us to buy and sell goods because there is a common way of measuring their value. Money is not a government phenomenon, and it need not and should not be managed by government. When central banks like the Fed manage money they are engaging in price fixing, which leads not to prosperity but to disaster.

The Federal Reserve has caused every single boom and bust that has occurred in this country since the bank's creation in 1913...

What the Austrian economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek victoriously asserted in the socialist calculation debate of the 1920s and 1930s—the notion that the marketplace, where people freely decide what they need and want to pay for, is the only effective way to allocate resources—may be obvious to many ordinary Americans. But it has not influenced government leaders today, who do not seem to see the importance of prices to the functioning of a market economy...

What exactly the Fed will do is anyone's guess, and it is no surprise that markets continue to founder as anticipation mounts. If the Fed would stop intervening and distorting the market, and would allow the functioning of a truly free market that deals with profit and loss, our economy could recover. The continued existence of an organization that can create trillions of dollars out of thin air to purchase financial assets and prop up a fundamentally insolvent banking system is a black mark on an economy that professes to be free.

read the entire WSJ essay

How the Government Caused the Financial Crisis

Peter Schiff: Financial Reform will Fail

1. The bill doesn’t get to the root causes of the crisis. Schiff blames former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan’s ‘too low for too long’ interest rate policy, combined with government-guaranteed mortgages for the rise and fall of the housing market. “That’s continuing today, it’s untouched by this bill. In fact, the Fed is more reckless today with zero percent interest rates than when they were one percent,” he tells Aaron in this clip. Plus, with so many private lenders out of business, the government is guaranteeing an even greater percentage of the mortgage market and has given Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac an unlimited line of credit until 2012.

2. The law fails to end ‘Too Big to Fail.’ “This law now guarantees that in the future even if they don’t want to bailout these banks they actually have to,” Schiff protests. “Designating a federally supervised wind-down process for major financial firms, the new structure signals to creditors that lending money to large financial firms will provide more security than loaning to firms too small to qualify for the program. As a result, these firms will enjoy continued advantages in the marketplace which will ensure the continued industry dominance.”

In contrast to Schiff's warning, the law does the following, according to Reuters:

“The bill would set up an "orderly liquidation" process that the government could use in emergencies, instead of bankruptcy or bailouts, to dismantle firms on the verge of collapse.

“The goal is to end the idea that some firms are 'too big to fail' and avoid a repeat of 2008, when the Bush administration bailed out AIG and other firms but not Lehman Brothers. Lehman's subsequent bankruptcy froze capital markets.

“Under the new rule, firms would have to have 'funeral plans' that describe how they could be shut down quickly.”

3. More regulation means higher costs for smaller financial services firms, reducing competition. “All the new regulations that are going to be written pursuant to this bill are going to add dramatically to the cost of doing business that is going to disproportionally hit the smaller firms who don’t have the economies of scale,” Schiff says, including his own firm in that mix.

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Watch An interview with Schiff here.

The Financial Crisis: A Marxist Explanation and a Critique

David Harvey



A Free Market Critique

New Financial REgulations Won't Fix Anything

The financial reform bill currently working its way toward President Barack Obama's desk for signing is being touted as the biggest overhaul of the banking and investment sectors since the Great Depression.

But the new regs won't be any more effective than the ones they replace in fixing anything or preventing the next major panic for at least three reasons.

1. New Watchdog, Old Tricks

They create a new watchdog consumer agency designed to protect consumers from their own supposed stupidity. You'll now be facing fewer choices when it comes to getting credit cards, loans, and doing other basic financial transactions.

2. Never Too Big To Fail

They replace "Too Big to Fail" with... "Too Big to Fail." One of the reasons why major financial institutions played Russian Roulette with the economy was because they were betting they would get bailed out. Which is precisely what happened. The new rules codify the idea that the government will make sure certain institutions can never fail. And if you think the big boys won't game that system, then you don't understand how well Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, et al have come through the current meltdown.

3. Housing Bubble Trouble

The financial crisis was set into motion by government policies that encouraged people to buy homes they couldn't afford at prices that were unsustainable. Between desperate attempts to keep people in houses and to keep interest rates below an effective rate of zero, the government continues to pour more money down the same rathole.

Markets work best when the risk and reward incentives are clear cut. When investors know they really can lose it all, they act responsibly with their money. If regulators think they can create a system that cushions us from bad decisions and doesn't encourage bad behavior, it's a delusion we'll all be paying for for a very long time.

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Cartoon: Counterfeiting

Cartoon: Financial Crisis

Peter Schiff on Banking Reform

Once again, President Obama completely missed the mark on the causes of and solutions to the financial crisis. In his speech this morning, the President outlined a major initiative to increase regulation of banks. He claims the financial crisis was caused by reckless speculation by greedy bankers in search of quick profits. What he fails to acknowledge is that this behavior was the direct result of the cheap credit supplied by the Federal Reserve and the moral hazard supplied by government regulations and subsidies.

In his efforts to prevent the next financial crisis, the President is focused on the symptoms rather than the disease. Therefore, his attempt to prevent future financial crises is doomed to failure, as the misguided policies that led to the last crisis are preserved while even more damaging policies are added. Current Fed policy is more reckless than before; continued subsidies to the mortgage market and the bailouts for banks are creating even bigger moral hazards; and, as a result, the economy is even more leveraged and more vulnerable to rising interest rates than ever.

The only way to prevent another financial crisis would be to reverse the fiscal and monetary policies that lead to the last crisis, and which now threaten to bring on an ever larger one. However, this Administration seems to lack the brains or the guts to do it.

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Financial Meltdown Article

Lost Trust: The Real Cause of the Financial Meltdown
by Bruce Yandle

Accounting standards, credit ratings, and credit-default swaps were created to help facilitate financial transactions by fostering trust. In the run-up to the credit-market freeze of 2008 those assurance mechanisms collapsed under the weight of political and regulatory pressures to aggressively expand homeownership and other policies.

read the article

Financial Crisis and Too Big to Fail

[T]he financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007 has posed a major problem. We had grown rather accustomed to singing the praises of free financial markets. The crisis threatens to discredit them.

But this crisis was not the result of deregulation and market failure. In reality, it was born of a highly distorted financial market, in which excessive concentration, excessive leverage, spurious theories of risk management and, above all, moral hazard in the form of implicit state guarantees, combined to create huge ticking time-bombs on both sides of the Atlantic. The greatest danger we currently face is that the emergency measures adopted to remedy the crisis have made matters even worse...

Economists have long held that bank failures pose a "systemic" economic risk, because failed banks are associated with monetary contractions for the economy as a whole. There is therefore a presumption that, if big banks are threatened with liquidity or solvency problems, they should be bailed out by the action of the central bank or government. Despite much pious talk of "moral hazard" prior to 2007, little was done to disabuse big financial institutions of this notion. They could and did assume that they enjoyed an implicit government guarantee...

During the crisis it was often said that officials at the Federal Reserve and Treasury would do "whatever it takes" to avoid a Great Depression. Now they must do whatever it takes to address one of the key causes of the financial crisis: the existence of financial institutions that consider themselves too big to fail – but which are run in such a way that they are bound to do so.

read the entire essay

Tyler Cowen on Politics and the Economy

Tyler Cowen's When Politics Don't Belong

FOR years now, many businesses and individuals in the United States have been relying on the power of government, rather than competition in the marketplace, to increase their wealth. This is politicization of the economy. It made the financial crisis much worse, and the trend is accelerating...

But we are now injecting politics ever more deeply into the American economy, whether it be in finance or in sectors like health care. Not only have we failed to learn from our mistakes, but also we’re repeating them on an ever-larger scale.

Lately the surviving major banks have reported brisk profits, yet in large part this reflects astute politicking and lobbying rather than commercial skill...

President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned of the birth of a military-industrial complex. Today we have a financial-regulatory complex, and it has meant a consolidation of power and privilege.

We’ve created a class of politically protected “too big to fail” institutions, and the current proposals for regulatory reform further cement this notion. Even more worrying, with so many explicit and implicit financial guarantees, we are courting a bigger financial crisis the next time something major goes wrong.

We should stop using political favors as a means of managing an economic sector...

read the entire essay

Barry Ritholtz comments on Cowen's essay

The large banks and brokers lobbied for special treatment and got it; they manipulated government legislation for their own ends; They asked for and received special treatment. This is a unique dispensation that almost no other businesses have enjoyed — certainly nowhere near the degree the finance sectors has received. Instead of earning their way via market place competition, these financials were uniquely treated in terms of regulation, legislation and tax policy.

Indeed, many people still seem wed to the wrong belief — it was not too much regulation that caused the problems. Rather, it was the special exemptions from regulation that in reality led to the crisis. From leverage to derivatives to lending standards to interest rates, the government acquiesced to the wants of the banking sector.

source

My thoughts: Ritholtz likes to talk of "radical deregulation." This is not what we have. Deregulation would apply across the board to all players. Ritholtz correctly points out that "these financials were uniquely treated in terms of regulation, legislation and tax policy." This is exactly what Cowen point out when he states, "Today we have a financial-regulatory complex, and it has meant a consolidation of power and privilege." This disagreement is more about terminology that facts.

The Financial Crisis and Systemic Failure

Economists not only failed to anticipate the financial crisis; they may have contributed to it--with risk and derivatives models that, through spurious precision and untested theoretical assumptions, encouraged policy makers and market participants to see more stability and risk sharing than was actually present. Moreover, once the crisis occurred, it was met with incomprehension by most economists because of models that, on the one hand, downplay the possibility that economic actors may exhibit highly interactive behavior; and, on the other, assume that any homogeneity will involve economic actors sharing the economist's own putatively correct model of the economy, so that error can stem only from an exogenous shock. The financial crisis presents both an ethical and an intellectual challenge to economics, and an opportunity to reform its study by grounding it more solidly in reality.

from the Critical Review

The Cato Journal: The Financial Crisis

The Cato Journal

An Interdisciplinary Journal of Public Policy Analysis
Volume 29 Number 1, Winter 2009

The Financial Crisis

James A. Dorn
Editor's Note
(PDF, 2 pp., 47Kb)

Jeffrey A. Miron
Bailout or Bankruptcy?
(PDF, 17 pp., 380Kb)

Anna J. Schwartz
Origins of the Financial Market Crisis of 2008
(PDF, 5 pp., 81Kb)

Allan H. Meltzer
Reflections on the Financial Crisis
(PDF, 6 pp., 86Kb)

Donald L. Kohn
Monetary Policy and Asset Prices Revisited
(PDF, 14 pp., 157Kb)

Otmar Issing
Asset Prices and Monetary Policy
(PDF, 7 pp., 96Kb)

Jeffrey M. Lacker
What Lessons Can We Learn from the Boom and Turmoil?
(PDF, 11 pp., 131Kb)

Charles W. Calomiris
Financial Innovation, Regulation, and Reform
(PDF, 27 pp., 264Kb)

Bert Ely
Bad Rules Produce Bad Outcomes: Underlying Public-Policy Causes of the U.S. Financial Crisis
(PDF, 22 pp., 944Kb)

Lawrence H. White
Federal Reserve Policy and the Housing Bubble
(PDF, 11 pp., 133Kb)

Wolfgang Münchau
The Case for Policy Sustainability
(PDF, 4 pp., 71Kb)

Andrew A. Samwick
Moral Hazard in the Policy Response to the 2008 Financial Market Meltdown
(PDF, 9 pp., 114Kb)

Kevin Dowd
Moral Hazard and the Financial Crisis
(PDF, 26 pp., 262Kb)

Gerald P. O’Driscoll Jr.
Money and the Present Crisis
(PDF, 20 pp., 208Kb)

Roger W. Garrison
Interest-Rate Targeting during the Great Moderation: A Reappraisal
(PDF, 14 pp., 167Kb)

William Poole
The Way Forward: Incentives, Not Regulations
(PDF, 7 pp., 94Kb)

Rep. Michele Bachmann v Geithner and Bernanke

The Current Crisis: An Asessment

The good news from our historical study of eight centuries of international financial crises is that, so far, they have all ended. And we confidently predict this one will end, too. We are just not quite so sure it will be nearly as soon as the chirpy forecasts coming from policymakers around the globe. The U.S. administration, for example, is now predicting that growth will renew in the latter part of this year and continue at a brisk pace of 4 percent for several years thereafter. Is this a fact-based forecast or wishful thinking?

A careful look at the international evidence on severe banking crises suggests a far more cautious assessment. The recessions that follow in the wake of big financial crises tend to last far longer than normal downturns, and to cause considerably more damage. If the United States follows the norm of recent crises, as it has until now, output may take four years to return to its pre-crisis level. Unemployment will continue to rise for three more years, reaching 11–12 percent in 2011...

Financial crises don't last forever. But this one could last a lot longer if policymakers don't start basing their actions on more realistic assessments of where we are and what is likely still to come.

read the article

Was Greenspan to Blame?

No: David R. Henderson and Jeffrey Hummel

Is Alan Greenspan to blame for the current housing bubble and the ongoing financial crisis? A growing chorus charges the former Federal Reserve chairman with being an "inflationist" whose loose monetary policy caused or significantly contributed to our current economic troubles. However, although Greenspan's policies weren't perfect, his monetary policy was in fact tight, and his legacy is one of having overseen low and stable inflation and a striking dampening of the business cycle.

Critics charge Greenspan with having carried on an excessively expansionary monetary policy, particularly following the recession of 2001. They note how low interest rates were from 2002 through 2004 and argue that those low rates paved the way for everything from high prices at the pump to high prices at the supermarket, from the housing crisis to the financial crisis. In so doing, those critics make the classic mistake of using interest rates to evaluate monetary policy, reasoning that if interest rates are low, recent monetary policy must have been expansionary. It is not the Federal Reserve but supply and demand that ultimately determines interest rates. Although central banks can push rates up or down to some degree, the globally integrated financial system reduces the Fed's ability to significantly influence rates.

read the paper

Yes: George A. Selgin

David Henderson and Jeff Hummel have managed to ruffle quite a few Austrian feathers with their recent Cato briefing paper, and no wonder: that paper claims not only that Alan Greenspan's Fed was innocent of any role in encouraging the housing boom but that Greenspan had actually managed to do something Austrian monetary economists have long claimed to be impossible, namely, solve the monetary-central-planning problem. Greenspan, by their assessment, managed to mimic the kind of money-demand accommodating money supply growth that would occur under free banking, thereby achieving (according to their paper's executive summary) "a striking dampening of the business cycle."

read the paper

My thoughts: Selgin is right.

Fed Created the Financial Bubble

With a collapsing housing market, a falling stock market, and a serious economic recession on the immediate horizon, the blame game about who or what has been behind the financial nightmare is in full swing.

In recent testimony before a congressional committee former Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan, pointed his finger at various financial insurance schemes and the inescapable uncertainty of the future. “We’re not smart enough as people,” he said. “We just cannot see events that far in advance.”

The one thing he did not admit was that it was his own monetary policy when he was at the helm of America’s central bank that created the boom that has now resulted in a crash.

The ballooning housing market and the rising stock market of the past decade would have been impossible if not for the easy money policy of the Federal Reserve. Monetary expansion through the banking system and resulting low rates of interest fed the housing and stock market frenzy, indeed it made them possible....

Greenspan was certainly right that an uncertain future makes it difficult to predict when speculative bubbles will burst. But it was not unpredictable to know that years of easy monetary policy and accompanying near zero or negative real interest rates were creating an unsustainable boom that was setting the stage for an inevitable great crash.

read the entire essay

“EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008”

Here is the one page summary


SUMMARY OF THE “EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008”

I. Stabilizing the Economy
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) provides up to $700 billion to the Secretary of the Treasury to buy mortgages and other assets that are clogging the balance sheets of financial institutions and making it difficult for working families, small businesses, and other companies to access credit, which is vital to a strong and stable economy. EESA also establishes a program that would allow companies to insure their troubled assets.

II. Homeownership Preservation
EESA requires the Treasury to modify troubled loans – many the result of predatory lending practices – wherever possible to help American families keep their homes. It also directs other federal agencies to modify loans that they own or control. Finally, it improves the HOPE for Homeowners program by expanding eligibility and increasing the tools available to the Department of Housing and Urban Development to help more families keep their homes.

III. Taxpayer Protection
Taxpayers should not be expected to pay for Wall Street’s mistakes. The legislation requires companies that sell some of their bad assets to the government to provide warrants so that taxpayers will benefit from any future growth these companies may experience as a result of participation in this program. The legislation also requires the President to submit legislation that would cover any losses to taxpayers resulting from this program from financial institutions.

IV. No Windfalls for Executives
Executives who made bad decisions should not be allowed to dump their bad assets on the government, and then walk away with millions of dollars in bonuses. In order to participate in this program, companies will lose certain tax benefits and, in some cases, must limit executive pay. In addition, the bill limits “golden parachutes” and requires that unearned bonuses be returned.

V. Strong Oversight
Rather than giving the Treasury all the funds at once, the legislation gives the Treasury $250 billion immediately, then requires the President to certify that additional funds are needed ($100 billion, then $350 billion subject to Congressional disapproval). The Treasury must report on theuse of the funds and the progress in addressing the crisis. EESA also establishes an Oversight Board so that the Treasury cannot act in an arbitrary manner. It also establishes a special inspector general to protect against waste, fraud and abuse.

source

full bill

Graph of Financial Crisis

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Bailout: Dead Banks Walking

Pull the plugs. Let the dead men be buried. Trying to keep insolvent bad deals alive uses all the scarce resources that newborn good deals need. This produces staggering costs of lost opportunity. Like Japan, we might not recover for a very long time if we think we can keep dead men walking. Let necessary liquidation happen. Recession is the mandatory painful reality of clearing markets in order to regain a recovering economy. Booms and busts will happen as long as the money system we have in place is such an unsound one.

But, within the reality of the money system we do have, happy days can not be here again by propping up the corpses of all the bad stuff that was birthed by reckless Federal policy. Greenspan and Bernanke deliberately drove interest rates from 6% to 1% and deliberately reduced the purchasing power of each unit of money by flooding the money supply by a 9% increase. It was boom time. Credit was thrown at everybody. Debt was the name of Nirvana, while savings were taxed. Everyone was high on a wealth effect that came from the effervescent bubbles. Our homes became our ATM machines. We were never as rich as the boom times led any of us to believe.

Don’t adopt the corpses through bailout deals. They will not revive. Ever. Bury them properly through liquidation. Return them to dust. Hunker down. Stop spending beyond means. Save.

source

My thoughts: Bailout is bad? Any questions?